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Abstract
This report describes the development of an encrypted tunnel for the Crazyflie drone 
made by Bitcraze. This project began with the need for protection while using a 
Crazyflie drone in a public space. The Crazyflie drone is using open source software 
and has no protection against hijacking. Any phone able to download the app to 
control the drone is able to hijack and control the drone.
To remedy this problem the communication between the Crazyradio and Crazyflie 
was encrypted. The encryption was implemented in such a way as to create a secure 
tunnel while only a minimum amount of code needed to be changed. The method of 
encryption chosen was AES 128 using GCM. The memory footprint of the encryption
solution on the drone was important and therefore minimised.
The resulting solution does protect against the type of hijacking a person with a 
phone is able to do. Furthermore, the strength of the encryption is of good enough 
quality to dissuade attacks from opportunistic attacks.
Keywords: Security, Encryption, AES, GCM, Tunnel, Open source.
Sammanfattning
Denna rapport beskriver en krypterad tunnel utvecklad för Crazyflie-drönaren som är 
skapad av företaget Bitcraze. Projektets mål är att minimera risken för att Crazyflie 
drönaren blir kapad i allmänna utrymmen. Då drönaren inte kan begränsa kontrollen 
till endast en styrenhet så kan den bli kapad av att någon i närheten använder 
kontroll-appen.
En lösning till detta problem är att kryptera kommunikationen från en drönare till en 
styrenhet. Implementationen av krypteringen är gjord på så sätt att en tunnel upprättas
mellan drönaren och styrenheten. Varken koden på drönaren eller på klienten behöver
förändras för att tunneln ska fungera. Krypteringsalgoritmen är AES 128 med GCM. 
Då drönarens minne är begränsad var det viktigt att minimera krypteringsbiblioteket 
storlek.
Resultatet av projektet blev en kryptering som stoppar att någon på en offentlig plats 
från att ladda ned ett styrprogram för att kapa drönaren. Opportunistiska anfall klarar 
även krypteringen att stoppa.
Nyckelord: Säkerhet, kryptering, AES, GCM, Tunnel, Öppen källkod
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The Crazyflie drone began as a competence development project in 2009. The 
project was started by Arnaud Taffanel, Marcus Eliasson and Tobias 
Antonsson. The Crazyflie is an open-source hardware and software drone. As 
the first Crazyflie was completed in 2011 the group started a company called 
Bitcraze to fund further development. This project is done for Bitcraze as a 
first step into encrypting the communication between the Crazyflie and 
Crazyradio.
1.1.1 Bitcraze
Bitcraze as a company was founded in early 2011 by the creators of the 
Crazyflie. The main purpose of Bitcraze is to fund the further development 
and production of the Crazyflie. Additional editions of the Crazyflie and 
Crazyradio have been released as well as new projects.[14]
The Crazyflie is not the only product Bitcraze produces however. CrazyRadio 
is a USB-radio card used to connect to the Crazyflie using Enhanced 
Shockburst among other products. Enhanced Shockburst is a radio protocol 
and explained in more detail in the Technical background section. One 
mentionable product is the android application to controll the Crazyflie 2.0 via
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE).
1.1.2 Needed functionality
Customers have a special use case for the small drone that is currently not 
accounted for. Some customers want to use the Crazyflie drone in publicity 
events or air shows. As the drone does not currently have any type of 
hijacking protection adding a layer of encryption to the controlling 
communication would provide sufficient protection for these events. 
1.2 Purpose
To protect the drone against hijacking this project aims to encrypt the 
communication between the Crazyradio and the Crazyflie. The level of 
protection needed to reduce the risk of accidental or opportunistic hijacking is 
not very high. 
Accidental hijacking is when two drones are in proximity with one another 
and share the radio space. This proximity results in either both radio 
controllers controlling both drones or they interfere causing loss of control 
over either drone. 
Opportunistic hijacking is when someone with malicious intent actively 
acquires a controller in order to hijack a drone. This is usually the android 
application but could easily be the Crazyradio connected to a laptop.
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1.3 Goals
Adding encryption to the communication between the drone and radio is the 
main goal of this project. The encryption should be added to existing code in 
such a way to maintain modularity. This means that the encryption 
functionality should be isolated so that it is easy to disable or remove 
encryption with minimal changes to the code. The way modularity was 
planned was to make the encryption act as a secure tunnel. 
1.4 Problem definition
What is needed to implement protection for the drone is described in this 
section.
1. What encryption algorithm is to be used to encrypt the communication?
2. What programming language will be used to implement encryption on 
the client?
3. What programming language will be used to implement encryption on 
the drone?
4. What cryptographic library will be used on the Crazyflie?
5. What cryptographic library will be used on the client?
6. What does the secure tunnel protect against?
1.5 Motivation
Drones have become a large part of society in recent years and pose 
interesting questions when it comes to computer safety. Because drones are 
flying machines they almost exclusively are controlled by radio 
communication and because the publicly available bandwidth is rather limited 
it can become the limiting factor in drone usage. Hijacking a flying drone 
implies not only of a risk to personal property but also towards the health of 
all those in the surrounding area, although in this case the health risk is 
minute.
The most direct solution to these problems is to ensure that the drones are 
controllable is to make the communication unique to every drone.
1.6 Scope limits
Controlling the drone with the android application is not covered in this 
project, only using the USB-dongle.
The communication is to be encrypted using AES 128-bit Galois Counter 
Mode. Sharing of the key is limited to programming it in before flashing the 
drone. 
There are a few exceptions to the encryption. The received signal strength 
indication(RSSI) message and flashing the drone are both exceptions to 
encryption.
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The RSSI is a message that is sent from the drone when a packet is received 
and it has nothing to send back. The message will not be encrypted as it serves
a purpose of checking whether or not the radio signal is strong enough to be 
received reliably in the first place. 
Flashing is when the client writes new firmware on the drone via the 
Crazyradio. Encryption is handled in the firmware of the drone. If the data that
is supposed to write the firmware is encrypted and there is no code for 
decrypting, the firmware will be corrupted.
3
2 Technical background
This chapter goes into detail about all of the important technical aspects of the 
project and is divided into five parts. The first part describes the Crazyflie 
drone components and what they do. The second part describes the Crazyradio
and the Client and how they interact with one another. The third part describes
what protocols are used. The fourth part describes how AES-GCM and the 
secure tunnel works. The fifth part describes the cryptographic libraries and 
the client. Figure 1 gives a general overview of where the different pieces of 
fit in relation to one another.
Figure 1. Complete overview of the technical setup and how they communicate.
2.1 The Crazyflie drone
This section describes the central parts of the hardware of the Crazyflie.
The Crazyflie is divided into two main components, the radio(nRF51822) and 
the main processing chip(STM32F405). The nRF51822 handles all of the raw 
radio communication. The received packets are then sent to the STM32F405 
where the Crazyflie firmware handles them. Figure 2 gives an overview of the 
Crazyflie components.[13]
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Figure 2. Overview of interactions between the Crazyflie firmware, cryptographic 
library and hardware.
2.1.1 nRF51822
The nRF51822 chip is the communications microcontroller used on the 
Crazyflie. The chip was developed by Nordic Semiconductor and is a chip 
specialising in 2.4 GHz wireless communication. The chip is based on an 
ARM Cortex M0 processing core with 128 Kbytes of flash memory and 16 
Kbytes of RAM. On the Crazyflie the nRF51 sends and receives all of the 
communication whether by Bluetooth Low Energy or by the Nordic 
Semiconductor proprietary protocol Enhanced ShockBurst. The data protocol 
used within these physical protocols is the Crazy RealTime Protocol (CRTP). 
This protocol is quite simple as it is only a header byte and 31 databytes. The 
nRF51 comes with a selection of precompiled binaries called soft devices. The
one used in the Crazyflie is Soft device 110.[6]
2.1.2 STM32F405
STM32F405RG is the main microcontroller used in the Crazyflie. The chip 
handles all of the flight controls and the majority of signal processing. The 
chip was developed by ST micro electronics and has a ARM 32bit Cortex M4 
processing core. The chip has 1 Mbyte of flash memory, 129 Kbytes of SRAM
and has a clock speed of 168MHz. The libraries used are the STM32F10x and 
STM324xx.[8]
2.1.3 FreeRTOS
FreeRTOS is essentially the operating system of the Crazyflie handling the 
scheduling of processes. FreeRTOS is a real time operating system used on the
Crazyflie drone to control the flight calculations. It is owned, developed and 
maintained by Realtime Engineers Ltd. FreeRTOS is used for scheduling and 
buffering the incoming and outgoing packets.[4]
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2.2 The Crazyradio
The CrazyRadio is a USB-radio used by the client. Connected to a computer 
the CrazyRadio is controlled through a software called Crazyflie Client. The 
Crazyflie Client is a python program that uses the Crazyradio Library to 
interact with the CrazyRadio. Figure 3 emphasises the portion of Python code 
and minimise the firmware for the nRF24LU1+.
Figure 3. Overview of the client side of the project.
2.2.1 nRF24LU1+
The nRF24LU1+ is the microcontroller used on the CrazyRadio unit. The 
chip’s main purpose is to communicate with the Crazyflie drone and thereby 
handling the lower level protocol Enhanced Shockburst. The chip has an 8-bit 
processing core at 16MHz with 2Kbytes + 256 Kbytes RAM and 16 to 32 
Kbytes of flash memory.[5]
2.2.2 Crazyradio Library
The Crazyradio library is a library developed by BitCraze in Python to handle 
the communication with the Crazyflie via the Crazyradio. This library is where
the encryption was implemented for the Crazyradio.[11]
2.3 Communication protocol
The protocols used by the Crazyradio and Crazyflie are Crazy RealTime 
Protocol and Enhanced Shockburst. Every packet sent from the Crazyradio 
from the Crazyflie is first encoded into a Crazy RealTime Protcol packet and 
then sent via the radio. The radio encodes the packet into the payload of an 
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Enhanced Shockburst packet. Figure 4 shows the network stack of the 
Crazyradio and Crazyflie.
 
Figure 4. The network stack of both the Crazyradio and Crazyflie. Enhanced Shockburst is 
the physical layer and Crazy Real Time Protocol is a layer above it.
2.3.1 Enhanced Shockburst
Figure 5. The Enhanced Shockburst packet divided into its five segments.
Enhanced Shockburst (ESB) is a proprietary radio protocol developed by 
Nordic Semiconductor. The protocol uses the 2,4 GHz portion of the 
industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio band. The protocol supports 
three data rates of 250 Kbps, 1 Mbps, and 2 Mbps. The packet is a maximum 
of 40 bytes and 9 bits. The packet has five segments where the payload is a 
segment with 32 bytes.[7]
The ESB packet is structured in five segments. The first segment is a preamble
of one byte. The preamble segment is used to synchronise the receivers 
demodulator. The second segment is for the address and is between 3 and 5 
bytes long. The address bytes are to specify which radio channel the 
transmitter is sending to. The third segment is the Packet Control Field(PCF) 
and is 9 bits long. The packet control field itself has three segments. The first 
segment describes the payload length and is 6 bits long. The second segment 
contains a PID that is 2 bits long. The PID indicates if the packet is a new 
packet or a resent packet. The last segment is the no-acknowledgement 
(NO_ACK) flag. The NO_ACK flag is used when the auto acknowledgement 
feature is used. When the flag is high, the receiver does not send an auto 
acknowledgement. The fourth segment is the payload, the payload is between 
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0 and 32 bytes long. There are two ways to handle the payload segment. Static
mode where every packet has a 32 byte long payload segment or dynamic 
mode where the length of the payload segment is only as long as the actual 
data. The fifth segment is the CRC that is either one or two bytes long. The 
CRC is calculated over the PCF and Payload.[21]
2.3.2 Crazy Real Time Protocol
Figure 6. The Crazy Realtime Protocol packet divided into its two parts.
The Crazy RealTime Protocol (CRTP) is a protocol developed by Bitcraze to 
manage the radio communication over the physical layer. The CRTP packet 
has a maximum of 30 bytes of data and one byte of header information. The 
header information is split into 3 segments. The first segment containing the 
most significant bit is the port address. This segment is four bits long and 
specifies what subsystem the message is for. The second segment is two bits 
long and is reserved for future use. The last segment is also two bits long and 
contains the channel number. The channel number specifies what the 
subsystem is to do with the packet.[15]
2.4 AES-GCM and Secure Tunneling
This section goes into detail about the AES and its GCM mode. Both AES and
GCM are standards published by NIST. As they are published standards the 
reference material for this section are the official publications. These 
publications are specified in reference number 1 and 2. Reference 3 is a book 
used by the report writer to gain a better understanding of the subject.[1,2,3]
2.4.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) is an encryption standard published by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It was published in
November of 2001. AES is based on the Rijndael block cipher specifically the 
128 bit block size version.
The 128 bit Rijndael cipher, called AES for the rest of the report, is a cipher 
based on Galois fields or finite fields specifically. The cipher works by first 
dividing the cleartext in to blocks of 16 bytes or 128 bits and then processes 
them individually at first and then scrambling them together. The cipher works
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in four layers, the byte substitution layer, shift row layer, mix column layer, 
and key addition layer.
In the byte substitution layer the block has all of its bytes substituted using a 
matrix where its value in hexadecimal decided what byte it will be substituted 
with. 
The shift row and mix column layers are there to disrupt the original order of 
the bytes and to spread them out evenly from every block to every other block.
Key addition is done with a bitwise exclusive-or operation of the block and a 
subkey derived from the input key.
The layers are executed in a specific order called rounds. These rounds consist
of in order the byte substitution layer, shift row layer, mix column layer, and 
the key addition layer. The number of rounds AES uses to encrypt any data is 
determined by the size of the key. The different key sizes AES supports are 
128, 192, and 256 bits of length and the number of rounds for the respective 
keys are 10, 12, and 14 rounds. The orders are however not used identically in 
every round. In the first round there is an additional key addition layer before 
the byte substitution layer while the last round contains no mix column layer.
2.4.2 AES Galois Counter Mode
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) is a combination of the AES counter mode and a
method to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC). These functions 
are called GCTR and GHASH. GCTR is simply AES in counter mode and 
GHASH is a hashing function using galois fields.
2.4.2.1 Counter mode
CTR or Counter mode is a mode of AES encryption.
Every block of data to be encrypted is combined with an initial value and a 
counter, they are added by the use of an or-operation. There are a few 
important aspects of the CTR mode. CTR is able to be computed in parallel. 
Because none of the blocks are dependant on any other and only on the 
counter and the initial value the encryption is able to be scaled up. The initial 
value used is an important factor. The value is based on the block size of the 
data to be encrypted. Due to AES only supporting 128bit block size the initial 
value is a 96 bit string the counter is the remaining 32 bits to ensure the entire 
string is the same size as the block. The initial value is special in the sense that
it may only be used once, a so-called nonce.
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2.4.2.2 Galois MAC generation
The MAC is generated through a process of hashing and encrypting the 
already encrypted data and some additional data. The MAC is generated by 
using a function called GHASH and then encrypting the resulting output. 
GHASH works by multiplying the blocks of the data with the blocks of a hash 
key, then with an exclusive-OR operation add these blocks together. The hash 
key is a string of blocks the same size as the data that needs a MAC generated.
After the GHASH function is complete the resulting block is then encrypted 
with AES-CTR to generate the message authentication tag. The resulting tag is
128 bits long but may be truncated down to seven different lengths. Five of the
aforementioned lengths are 128, 120, 112, 104 and 96 bits long and do not 
require additional security concern. The remaining two are 64 and 32 bits long
and require consideration of the length of input data and the lifetime of the 
hash key.
2.4.3 Secure tunnelling
Secure tunnelling is the practice of adding security to already existing 
protocols and communication systems by adding a protection layer. Security is
a subjective term more easily defined by what it is not. A connection is not 
considered secure if it does not provide enough secrecy or protection as the 
user needs. Security in this project is defined as the protection of one drone 
with one controller from another controller. The two parts of this secure tunnel
is encryption management and key management.
2.4.3.1 Encryption management
Encryption is what makes the tunnel secure. How encryption is implemented 
important. Data sent from either the Crazyflie or the Crazyradio is encrypted 
as the data is about to be sent. The encrypted package is given a special header
and is then packed into a CRTP packet, that packet is put into an ESB packet.
The encryption makes the tunnel secure as specified. Due to the memory 
restriction, replay attacks are possible. To protect against replay attacks the 
packet IV needs to be stored. At four bytes the number of IV permutations are 
over 4 billion. The type of data structures that allow insertion and searching 
with a time complexity of one simply requires more space than is available on 
the drone. 
2.4.3.2 Key management
Keeping the key secret is paramount to keeping the tunnel secure. The keys 
are not shared through communications. The keys are shared before any 
communication is made between the drone and the client. Specifically the key 
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the drone encrypts packages with is flashed to its firmware before use. The 
key on the client side however is available in cleartext directly in the library.
2.5 Cryptographic libraries and Python
This section goes into detail about the cryptographic libraries used for both the
drone and the client.
2.5.1 WolfSSL 
WolfSSL is a cryptographic library for the C programming language. It was 
developed by the WolfSSL company and written in ANSI C. ANSI C is a 
standard of the C programming language published by the American National 
Standards Institute. Due to it being a published standard it is supported by 
most of the modern C compilers.
The WolfSSL library is designed to be used in embedded devices. To allow 
this WolfSSL is able to have its memory footprint be reduced rather 
substantially. The minimal memory size is around 20Kbyte and runtime 
memory size is about 1Kbyte.
The cryptographic engine used in WolfSSL is the wolfCrypt library. A 
cryptographic engine is the part of the library that houses the code 
implementation of encryption algorithms. For example, The WolfSSL library 
has support for DTLS, DTLS is a communication protocol that uses the AES 
encryption algorithm. WolfCrypt contains the AES encryption algorithm and 
the WolfSSL library contains the necessary parts for DTLS to function.
Versions 3.6.0, 3.6.1, 3.6.6 of the wolfCrypt library have a FIPS 140-2 
certificate. The FIPS 140-2 certificate is an indication of security level 
assessed by the CMVP. FIPS is the Federal Information Processing Standard 
and CMVP is the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, both are 
operated under NIST.[9]
2.5.2 Python
Python was created by Guido van Rossum as a successor of a language called 
ABC. It began development during december 1989 and its first version was 
published 1991. In this project Python 3.4.3 is used to send commands to the 
Crazyflie via the CrazyRadio using the CrazyRadio Library. Code example 1 
is of Python code in section 4.3.1. [20]
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2.5.3 Cryptography
Cryptography is a cryptographic library for the Python programming 
language. It is an open source project available on github with over 100 
contributors. The repository is controlled by the Python Cryptographic 
Authority (PyCa). The functionality of Cryptography is more than adequate 
for the scope of the project.[16, 17]
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3 Methodology
There were three phases in this project. These were the research and analysis 
phase, the prototyping phase and the implementation and testing phase.
The research and analysis phase has two parts namely gathering information 
and analysing the problem definition. Gathering information was done through
reading the official documentation. Analysis was done as to determine the 
number and severity of problems to solve and how to do it.
The Prototyping phase consisted of setting up the development environment, 
adding the cryptographic libraries, setting up testable sub-systems on the 
drone and learning to use the cryptographic libraries.
The implementation and testing phase has two parts. The implementation 
phase was where the tunnel and encryption were implemented. During the 
testing of the software a few test programs were run.
3.1 Research and Analysis Phase
Firstly, the problems the project is supposed to solve have to be described. The
main problem is hijacking, i.e., when an attacker takes control of a drone from
the owner of the drone. In this case a USB radio is used to control the drone 
and another USB radio is trying to take control of the drone.
Before this project, the attacker could quite easily take control of the drone. To
stop this the owner needs to stop any other radio from communicating with the
drone and to do this an encryption algorithm will be introduced.
The chosen encryption algorithm needs to have a certain set of properties. 
Because the size of the packet is limited, the encryption algorithm’s memory 
footprint needs to be small. The speed of encrypting and decrypting is 
important as the part of the drone that handles ciphering also handles the flight
controls. The cipher needs to be cryptographically strong to ensure that the 
key or keys are not easily solved. The underlying radio communication 
protocol is asynchronous so this too had to be taken into account. DTLS was 
an early contender for cipher algorithm, however due to the software structure 
of the drone and USB-radio there was a lack of support systems requiered to 
have fully functional DTLS. The choice of cipher was AES-GCM as it had all 
of the prerequisite properties needed for this project.
How to best implement the encryption is an important question. Either there 
had to be a change to the entirety of the code base that handles incoming and 
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outgoing packets or there could be an added after each packet has been 
completed and is about to be sent where encryption can take place. Obviously 
a tunnel was chosen as the easiest and most modular way to implement 
encryption.
Communication with Bitcraze was done by face-to-face meetings or through 
the messaging and VoIP service Skype. As the Bitcraze offices are not in the 
same city as the thesis worker, most communication was done through Skype.
The environment in which the programming took place was using the virtual 
machine software VirtualBox. VirtualBox ran the official Bitcraze Virtual 
Machine version 2016-06-06. This virtual machine had almost everything 
needed to develop for the Crazyflie. The one thing it was lacking was the 
encryption libraries.
As previously mentioned, the easiest way to implement the encryption is to 
make a tunnel between the radio and the rest of the system. For the Crazyflie 
this means that an encryption “link” is made which can slot in for the radio 
link. Figure 9 gives a visual representation of the “link”.
For the Crazyradio however it is not quite that simple. Changes in the Python 
library have to be made in the specific send and receive functions. This has the
drawback of not being as modular in the way of turning off or disabling the 
encryption for whatever reason but it does still leave the rest of the code the 
same as changes only needs to be done in one file.
3.2 Prototyping phase
Prototyping the possible solutions is the next step to make a complete solution.
In this phase there were a lot of trial and error implementation of the different 
parts of the final solution.
The first step in prototyping was making a subsystem where messages could 
be sent and have the expected response. The subsystem made would simply 
take a packet with a certain header setup and respond with a fixed string at 
first. Later this subsystem was used for debugging and error responses as it 
was available and separate from any other system.
Due to the memory limitation on the drone the WolfSSL library needed to be 
scaled down to as small a memory footprint as it could possibly be. There was 
unfortunately no good way to determine the size of the library on the memory. 
The way of scaling down the size of WolfSSL is simply following the 
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documentation and realising what parts of the library that are important. The 
most important parts of WolfSSL were the AES-GCM functions.
3.3 Implementing phase
During the implementing phase the lessons from the previous two phases are 
put into action.
Maintaining the modularity of the code proved to be a significant problem 
when it came to the USB-radio code as the code structure was completely 
different. The structure of the code on the drone was so that communication 
was done through a variable link connected to the radio and then the rest of the
system. The link in this case could consist of different types of 
communications channels such as USB or radio. 
When the implementation of the tunnel was nearing completion testing began. 
Testing was initially done by simply starting the drone and seeing if it crashed.
The drone has four LEDs. The LEDs show the status of the drone. There are a 
three types of crashes that are visible via the LEDs. If the Crazyflie does not 
boot, one blue LED shines continously. If the Crazyflie boots but boots 
incorrectly a red LED blinks 5 times fast. If the Crazyflie crashes during 
operation a LED will stop blinking. This test gives no real information on 
what went wrong but does tell when something goes wrong. 
After the software stopped crashing testing was done by using a Python script 
developed by Bitcraze to ramp the drone rotors. The script is called Ramp.py 
and does exactly what it says, it ramps the engines up and then down once. 
This test was to ensure both sides could encrypt and decrypt the messages 
sent. The result of the script is a visual confirmation that the communication is
received and produces a functional result.
Testing the drone in proximity to another drone was difficult as the number of 
drones was limited to one. Testing was done by using the android application 
to connect to the drone. The result of the android testing was that it was unable
to act on any commands.
The code is available on Github and is linked to in the appendix.
3.4 Reference criticism
All references with the exception of reference [3] are official documentation 
and therefore can be considered reliable.
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Reference [3] is the book Understanding Cryptography. Understanding 
Cryptography is written by Christof Paar and Jan Perlzl. The book is published
by the Springer company. Christof Paar and Jan Perlzl are both Professors of 
the Ruhr university in Bochum, Germany. 
“Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christof Paar has the Chair for Embedded Security at the 
University of Bochum...” - Springer[22]. 
“Prof. Dr.-Ing. January Pelzl started his career at Bosch Telecom GmbH. He 
has a Ph.D. in applied cryptography...” - Springer[22].
Due to the expertise of the authors the book can be considered reliable.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Requirements
The number of requirements for this project was rather small. This gave the 
developer a large amount of freedom to choose the best solution for any 
problem.
The project began with a need for protection against hijacking. This was 
quickly recognised as a need for encryption. The nature of the project dictates 
the requirements two and three below. The last two requirements were 
specified by Bitcraze to simplify the development for the Crazyradio. Making 
changes in the code for the firmware of the Crazyradio requires specialist 
equipment that is expensive and not easily available.
Requirements:
1. The communication between the Crazyflie and the Crazyradio must be 
encrypted.
2. The developed code must work on the Crazyflie drone.
3. The code developed for the drone must be written in the C 
programming language.
4. The developed code must work with the Crazyradio dongle.
5. The code developed for the client must be written in the Python 
programming language.
4.2 Choice motivation
The choice of cryptographic library is an important decision to make when 
encryption is the main focus of a project. Therefore the decision of 
cryptographic library is detailed in this section.
4.2.1 WolfSSL
There are three big contenders for cryptographic C libraries and those are 
Mbed TLS, WolfSSL and OpenSSL. As OpenSSL is not designed to be ported 
and work on embedded devices. Choosing the cryptographic library to use on 
the drone was essentially a choice between Mbed TLS and WolfSSL. Both 
were good choices with good forum support, documentation, and both were 
according to their documentation easy to port to new embedded hardware. 
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WolfSSL was chosen as a request by Bitcraze when both were given as viable 
and suitable options.
4.2.2 Cryptography
The number of choices for cryptographic libraries available for Python were 
unfortunately quite limited. The closest comparable to a stable and supported 
release was for the Cryptography library originally by the Python 
Cryptographic authority (PyCa). This github library has the largest number of 
contributers to a single cryptography library that had support for AES-GCM. 
The bigest drawback about open source projects where no official group has 
claimed responsibility is that there is no certificate of functionality or security 
to hold the responsible organisation to if it fails.
4.2.3 Client side encryption
Encryption on the client side could have been implemented differently. It 
could have been implemented in the firmware of the Crazyradio. This would 
have made the project larger in scope. The needed hardware and development 
environment are different from developing for the Crazyflie drone and client. 
This would have made the programming language for the client side C as well.
4.3 Substantial problems and their sollutions
4.3.1 Multi packet “packet”
ESB is the main limiting factor. This caused CRTP to have a limit. ESB is 
asynchronous so CRTP is aswell. Because encryption adds data to be sent a 
packet with 31 databytes has to be split into two packets instead. This forced 
the need for package ID. Package ID is used to combine two packets before 
decryption to ensure that everything is as it should.
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Code example 1. This code example shows how the Crazyradio library code replaces all of 
the content of the packet with the second part of the encrypted packet.
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5 Results
The results of this project was to implement a secure tunnel between the 
Crazyradio and the Crazyflie. This was accomplished by introducing 
encryption. The detailed description of how and where encryption was 
implemented is described in the following subchapters.
5.1 Ciphered packet structure
Figure 7. The Ciphered packet divided into its 5 segments.
The ciphered packet is separated into five parts. The first part is the header of 
one byte. The header byte is always the same and is the hex B3.  The second 
part is the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD). The AAD contains the 
header of the unencrypted packet and a packet identifier(PID).The PID is a 
single byte where the first five bits is the length of the cipher text, the next two
bits are a packet number and the last bit tells if the packet is a split packet. The
third part contains the Initialisation Vector(IV). The IV is a specific number 
used for encryption and decryption with AES-GCM. The IV is a nonce. The 
fourth part contains the authentication tag. The authentication tag is generated 
by the AES-GCM algorithm. The fifth part contains the cipher text. The cipher
text is the encrypted data.
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5.1.1 Split packet
Figure 8. A cipher text is split into two packets.
When more than 20 bytes of data is in the original packet to be encrypted, the 
packet might have to be split into two packets. These two packets contain the 
same AAD, IV and tag. There is a change to the PID. As the PID contains one 
bit to tell if the packet has been split, that one bit simply flips to a one.
5.2 Drone
The drone side has a specific subsystem that is interchangeable with other 
methods of sending and receiving packets. This subsystem is called a link.
Figure 9. The flow of packets through the drone.
5.2.1 Receiving
The AES-GCM link receives a raw packet from the radio link, if the packet is 
a split packet it stores the IV, TAG, AAD, and data into buffers, waits for the 
next packet with the same PID number. If the next packet does not contain the 
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same PID number the new packet overwrites the first packet, if it does have 
the same PID number the new packet has its data added to the buffer of the 
first packet data. The IV, AAD, and TAG are then used to decrypt the data in a 
decrypt function from the WolfSSL library. The packet is then reencoded in to 
the unencrypted version with its previous header and unencrypted data and 
passed into the system via the CRTP service or a FreeRTOS qeue.
5.2.2 Sending
The AES-GCM link receives an unencrypted packet from the rest of the 
system. It seperates the header from the rest of the data. The header is added 
as additional data to the encryption process together with a PID that contains 
the multipacket-bit, the PID number and the length of the unencrypted data. 
The Initializing vector is produced. Using the IV, AAD and the data the 
encrypted packet is created. A ciphered packet header is added to the packet. 
The AAD, IV and TAG are added to the packet. If the length of the data was 
more than 20 bytes the first packet only contains the first 20 encrypted bytes. 
A second packet then gets created and has the two AD bytes first and then the 
remaining encrypted data bytes.
5.3 Radio and client
On the client side there is no specific link or subsystem, instead the encryption
and decryption is in the send and receive functions of the Python radio 
interface.
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Figure 10. The flow of packets between the Crazyradio and the 
Crazyradio Library. Only the cipher text, IV, AAD and TAG are 
dealt with by Cryptography.
5.3.1 Receiving
When the Crazyradio Library receive function receives a packet it stores the 
header, the AAD bytes, IV bytes and TAG bytes in buffers. The data is put in a
different buffer, if the received packet has more than 20 bytes of encrypted 
data there will be a second packet with the same PID. The second packet will 
add its encrypted data to the data buffer. A custom function using the 
Cryptography library will decrypt the data. Using the decrypted data a new 
packet with the first byte in the AAD is used as the header and the decrypted 
data as the payload.
5.3.2 Sending
When the Crazyradio Library send function receives a packet to send the data 
is separated from the header and put in a buffer. The header is used together 
with a generated PID to produce the additional data for AES-GCM encryption.
A IV is randomised, the IV and the AAD are used to encrypt the data. The new
packet gets a new header and its data buffer gets filled with AAD, IV, TAG 
and then the encrypted data. Depending on the size of the unencrypted data the
packet can be split in two if it is more than 20 bytes of data.
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6 Conclusion
This project was to minimise the possibility of hijacking the Crazyflie drone 
when flown in public spaces. This was done by adding encryption to the 
communication. The encryption added was AES using GCM mode.
The encryption was added in such a way as to make a secure tunnel. Both 
sides are encrypted before the packet is sent via the radio and decrypted before
entering any packet management. This way there needed to be almost no 
change to how the rest of the drone functions.
AES was chosen as it is a highly secure cipher and can be made rather small. 
There was no AES implementation already on the drone or the client so this 
had to be added. They became available by adding cryptographic libraries to 
the programs. WolfSSL was chosen as it could configured to reduce its 
memory footprint to a small size. WolfSSL is a C library with FIPS 140-2 
certificate and was deemed more than sufficiently cryptographically sound.
For the client program the library Cryptography was chosen. Cryptography 
was chosen as it was deemed to be sufficiently secure.
6.1 Summary of the Problem Solution
1. What encryption algorithm is to be used to encrypt the communication?
The chosen encryption algorithm is AES using GCM.
2. What programming language will be used to implement encryption on 
the client?
As the client and Crazyradio library are both in python it was the logical 
choice to use python. The encryption could be implemented on the radio and is
further explained in section 4.2.3.
3. What programming language will be used to implement encryption on 
the drone?
The firmware of the drone is written in C, therefore C was the language used 
add encryption to the drone. Alternative programming languages are not really
applicable for the drone.
4. What cryptographic library will be used on the Crazyflie?
The cryptographic library used on the Crazyflie is the WolfSSL library.
5. What cryptographic library will be used on the client?
The cryptographic library used on the client is Cryptography library.
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6. What does the secure tunnel protect against?
The secure tunnel protects against other clients trying to use a already 
controlled drone.
6.2 Ethical reflection
6.2.1 Secrecy or security through obscurity
The number of ethical implications of this project are minimal however there 
is one big question of Security through obscurity as a type of IT security. This 
project is open source and therefore has no wall for people to run into when 
doing security analysis.
Security through obscurity is the concept of having obscure or hidden source 
code and design of the software. This as a means of security is probably 
enough to dissuade any benign “attackers”. Any other type of “attacker” is 
more then likely not to either report the issue found or if it has any benefit for 
them use it to their advantage. The problem with this that it can give a false 
sense of security to both developers and users as the security holes will more 
than likely not be published or reported. Another real issue with the security 
through obscurity line of thought is that no program is perfect. There are 
always problems with every program to ever need any type of security.
6.3 Further development
The way AES GCM was implemented to fit a pre-existing protocol posed 
some challenges. The solution to those challenges was to shorten the tag and 
the initialisation vector. This is not a problem in and of itself if done 
thoroughly. Unfortunately there was one NIST recommendation out of scope 
for this project. Namely the changing of the hash-subkey at a frequent interval.
This is controlled by the WolfSSL library and was therefore not in the hands of
the developers of this project. This is a matter to look into however and 
therefore is fit to be further development.
As mentioned in the scope limit there are a list of more features that are 
desired. Making the client program able to change the encryption key and 
write it to the drone via USB is one of the future projects of the Crazyflie. 
Another perhaps more necessary than the previous one is to enable and disable
encryption when using the Crazyradio library.
Future development for the Crazyflie hardware is in progress and is being 
actively discussed at Bitcraze. One of the changes that could be made is the 
size of the packets. The size of the packets could be larger to accommodate 
both the encryption and the data required for the secure communication 
between the drone and the Crazyradio.
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Another hardware change on the drone could be adding more memory. This 
could allow the secure tunnel to store a history of received packets IV’s and 
discriminate what packets are decrypted. A packet with an IV that has already 
been received could simply be discarded. However, with longer IV’s there 
would need to be even more memory allocated to storing the history of 
received packets.
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7 Terminology
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard. An encryption standard published by 
FIPS.
AAD – Additional Authenticated Data.
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check.
CRTP – Crazy Realtime Protocol.
DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security.
ESB – Enhanced Shockburst.
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards.
GCM – Galois Counter Mode, a mode of AES operation
GMAC – Galois Message Authentication Code
Hash – the result of a hash function.
Hash function – A function that maps any data with arbitrary size to data with 
a fixed size.
IV – Initialisation vector.
MAC – Message Authentication Code
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Tehcnology. An institute under the 
United States Department of Commerce.
RAM – Random Access Memory.
TLS – Transport Layer Security.
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9 Appendicies
The code of the project is available on github through two repositories. Both 
repositories are linked here.
https://github.com/Lursidon/crazyflie-firmware
https://github.com/Lursidon/crazyflie-lib-python
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